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Abstract 
Technological advances in electric energy system 
data acquisition systems, time synchronization, and 
cyber assets used in power system substations, 
distribution systems, and control centers offer new 
opportunities to dramatically improve the practice of 
monitoring, protection, control, and operation of the 
system. We can make the computer based new 
technologies smarter and more intelligent to fully 
automate the basic protection and control functions. 
The challenges posed to the system from the continuous 
deployment of renewable resources that are typically 
inverter interface resources require monitoring of the 
system at much higher rates and development of 
protection and control systems that can respond in much 
faster rates than for conventional systems and they are 
immune to the characteristics of the new system, namely 
reduced fault currents and suppressed negative and 
zero sequence components of the fault currents. We 
propose a new system that provides validated data at 
fast rates (once per cycle), protective relays that are 
immune to the effects of inverter interfaced generation, 
detect anomalies, and enable the continuous operation 
of relays and other functions even in the presence of 
hidden failures in instrumentation. This system will 
enable the operators to meet the challenges posed by the 
evolving power system and provides robust solutions to 
the new requirements.  
1. Introduction  
Power systems are experiencing a fast 
transformation from the integration of renewables, new 
technologies for metering, protection and control, and 
fast occurring transients that challenge the present 
protection control and operation systems. We have seen 
usual fault events which were cleared within typical 
relay response times (few cycles), but because of the 
interaction of the fault transients and the control 
characteristics of inverter interfaced resources, 
substantial amounts of renewable resources were lost. 
These events are sounding the alarm that the power 
system of the future will be vulnerable to massive loss of 
renewables from typical fault events that have not caused 
any concern for the legacy power system. 
Additional challenges exist. At the protection level, 
the new characteristics affect the operation of legacy 
protection systems. Specific issues that have been 
identified are: high penetration levels of renewables 
affect the levels of faults currents and the characteristics 
of fault currents with reduced negative and zero 
sequence components. This, in turn, affects the 
performance of legacy relays as they depend on these 
characteristics to detect and protect against faults. One 
can expect increased levels of relay mis-operations as the 
penetration levels of renewables increase. 
Another challenge is the fact that the transient 
response of the power system has become faster due to 
the presence of many power electronic systems. Legacy 
SCADA with data acquisition rates very slow for these 
transients is inadequate to address the new problems. It 
is important to use a much faster data acquisition system 
and commensurate protection and control technologies. 
It is important to address these challenges. This 
paper presents a system that provides methods that are 
not affected by the changing characteristics of the power 
system and provides a fast response to the possible 
events in the power system.  
2. Objective of centralized substation 
protection 
Substation automation has been a continuous effort 
of the industry since the advent of computer technology. 





As technology advances, substation automation has been 
transforming into a more powerful but more complex 
task. Complexity generates risk. The risk can be 
mitigated with methods that have the capability to self-
check and verify the various components of substation 
automation. The objective of this paper is to present 
technologies that enable full self-checking and 
verification of all the functions involved in substation 
operations, namely protection, control, and operation. 
This new approach is referred to as resilient Centralized 
Substation Protection, or rCSP. The objectives of rCSP 
are: (a) provide supervision of the protection and control 
function in a substation to ensure reliable performance of 
protection and control functions, (b) support the needs of 
the control center for substation visibility and awareness, 
(c) detect any anomalies in the substations operation 
including bad data, altered data, hidden failures, etc. and 
(d) detect in real-time any cyber-attacks. The first three 
items provide operational security, while the last ensures 
cyber security. 
The system provides a validated model and current 
operating conditions, which constitutes the fundamental 
input for practically all the applications in a control 
center. In the paper, we discuss one application, optimal 
power flow, as an example. 
The paper describes how each of these objectives is 
achieved with the proposed approach. 
3. Dynamic State Estimation protection 
3.1. Description 
The Dynamic State Estimation Based Protection 
(EBP) method (a.k.a setting-less protection) is the basic 
building block of the centralized substation protection. 
The EBP was inspired by the differential protection 
method, which has been proved to be one of the most 
effective protection schemes without the need to be 
coordinated with any other protection functions [1]-[2]. 
Compared to the differential protection method, where 
the relay only monitors the validity of Kirchhoff’s 
Current Law (KCL), EBP monitors the validity of all 
applicable physical laws in the protection zone, 
including KCL, Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law (KVL), 
motion laws, thermodynamics laws and other depending 
on the type of the protection zone. EBP does not require 
complex settings and coordination with other protection 
functions. To implement EBP, three critical parts are 
required. (a) A high-fidelity dynamic model of the 
protection zone, (b) a set of measurements, and (c) a 
dynamic state estimation algorithm to monitor the 
operating conditions of the components within the 
protection zone. The three key parts of EBP will be 
briefly introduced in the following parts of this section, 
starting with the construction of the protection zone 
dynamic model. 
As previously mentioned, a dynamic model of the 
protection zone is required for EBP. The dynamic model 
of a protection zone consists of models of each 
component within the protection zone.  The first step of 
constructing the dynamic model of a specific component 
is to generate the mathematical model in terms of 
differential and algebraic equations that express the 
physical laws of the component. If there exist non-linear 
terms with order higher than two, then the model is 
quadratized by introducing additional state variables. 
The end result is a quadratized model which is cast into 
a standard format called Quadratized Device Model 
(QDM), shown below: 
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where i(t) is the through variable vector of the model 
(terminal currents), x(t) is the state variable vector of the 
model, Y, D, F are coefficient matrices, and C are 
constant terms in the model.  
The QDM expressed with Equations (1) is 
integrated over the time intervals [t-2h, t] and [t-2h, t - h] 
via quadratic integration, where 2h is the time step. The 
result of the quadratic integration becomes the Algebraic 
Quadratic Companion Form (AQCF), shown as follows: 
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where x(t, tm)=[ x(t), x(tm)] and i(t), i(tm) are the state 
variable vector and through variable vector at times t and 
tm, respectively. Yeqx, Fieqx, Neqx, Meq, and Keq are matrices 
calculated from the coefficient matrices in QDM. Details 
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about the model quadratization process and quadratic 
integration were introduced in our previous publications, 
for example [3]. 
To obtain the AQCF model of the protection zone, 
the AQCF models of each component in the protection 
zone are first developed and subsequently are used to 
form the AQCF model for the entire protection zone. 
This process consists of the application of KCL at the 
interface nodes among components of the protection 
zone, which results in the elimination of through 
variables, and appending the internal equations of all 
components to the protection zone model. 
The measurements are expressed as functions of the 
state of the protection zone. This is achieved by using the 
AQCF model of the protection zone to express each 
measurement by the model of the zone. Since the model 
is in the standard form shown in equation (2), the 
measurement model is also in the standard form shown 
as Equation (3), where z(t) are the measurements, x(t), 
u(t), and i(t) are the state variables, control variables and 
electric current variables of the protection zone, 
respectively.  
, , , , ,
, ,( ) ( ) ( )
T i T i T i
m x m x m u m u m ux m
m m x m u m m
Y F Y F F C
C N t h N t h M i t h K
     
               
     
     
      





The measurements are assumed to have been 
collected with PMUs, MUs, and/or PMU enabled 
numerical relays.  
The dynamic state estimation uses the measurement 
model (3) and one of two options: (a) unconstrained 
optimization (weighted least squares approach) or (b) 
constraint optimization. The solution of the dynamic 
state estimation provides the estimates of the states, 
normalized residuals, the covariance of the state variable 
errors, and other metrics. An important part of the 
dynamic state estimation is the chi-square test which 
provides the probability that the measurements fit the 
model of the protection zone within the accuracy of the 
measurements. We refer to this probability as the 
“goodness of fit.” This probability is also referred to as 
confidence level. A high confidence level (close to 1) 
indicates all the components in the protection zone are 
operating normally. A low confidence level (close to 
zero) indicates an abnormality within the protection 
zone, for example, a fault, a hidden failure, a cyber-
attack that altered data. The details about chi-square test 
calculations can be found in our previous publications 
[1], [2]. 
3.2. Immunity to inverter effects 
As penetration levels of Distributed Energy 
Resources (DERs) in the power system increase, the 
characteristics of DERs are affecting the performance of 
power system protection. New challenges have emerged 
in this area, such as bidirectional power flow in 
distribution circuits, lower fault current levels, reduced 
negative and zero sequence currents during faults 
affecting the ability of relays to determine fault direction 
and others [4]. EBP is immune to these issues as it detects 
faults based on the overall consistency between the 
measurements and the dynamic model of the protection 
zone. So, changes in the characteristics and levels of fault 
currents will not affect the performance of EBP.  
Distribution system protection schemes are 
dependent on the unidirectional power and current flow 
in classical distribution systems. The bidirectional power 
flows created by DERs cause issues to the conventional 
protection system. The combined current of forward and 
reverse power flow may be smaller than the protection 
setting threshold of the overcurrent protection. Large 
reverse currents due to DER may also trigger false 
tripping signals. With EBP, the tripping decision is made 
based on the consistency between the measurements and 
the protection zone model instead of overcurrent or 
direction of current flow at certain buses. The direction 
of the power flow will not affect the performance of the 
EBP relays.  
Due to the complexity of the electric power system, 
the implementation of conventional protection schemes 
requires complex coordination between protection 
devices and various protection functions. With the 
proposed EBP scheme, there is no need to coordinate 
with other protection functions. EBP only needs a 
dynamic model of the protection zone and 
measurements. Also, the protection zone parameters can 
be estimated and corrected (fine-tuned) by the dynamic 
state estimation; specifically, the dynamic state 
estimation is modified to include as unknown states 
specific parameters that we need to fine-tune. In this 
case, the dynamic state estimation will provide the best 
estimate of the specific parameter(s).  
Previous simulation results [5] showed that EBP 
outperformed other protection schemes in protecting 
distributed systems in many test cases. Overall, the 
proposed centralized substation protection scheme with 
EBP is reliable and effective for power systems with high 
penetration of inverter-interfaced resources. 
3.3. Model validation 
The accuracy and fidelity of the dynamic model are 
critical to the performance of the proposed EBP 
approach. For some components that are widely used in 
power system modeling, there already exist high-fidelity 
dynamic models. However, for some newly introduced 
components, especially inverters with proprietary 
manufacturer information, the modeling accuracy and 
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fidelity may not be as high. Therefore, it is necessary to 
validate the protection zone model. One of the model 
validation approaches is hybrid dynamic simulation [6], 
where measured signals are applied to the protection 
zone model. The simulation results of the model are 
compared with actual measured data to validate the 
model. In the proposed EBP scheme, DSE is used to 
validate the protection zone model. As shown in Figure 
1, the field measurements and output from the dynamic 
model are used to calculate the consistency between the 
measurements and the model output. If the result shows 
a high confidence level, it means the measurements and 
model are validated. Vice versa, a low confidence level 
indicates that the measurements contain errors, or the 
model is not accurate, or both. Model validation with 
DSE requires accurate measurements from the field. 
Merging units are used to collect the measurements to 
avoid errors introduced by usually long cables in 
instrumentation channels and other instrumentation 
channel inaccuracies. 
Parameter estimation also plays an important role in 
the model validation process. If the model is inaccurate 
initially, model parameters are fine-tuned based on the 
results of DSE.  Parameter identification tasks are 
performed by setting some key model parameters as 
unknown states. [7] So, these key model parameters are 
fine-tuned with real-time field data to consistently 
improve the accuracy and fidelity of the dynamic model. 
The validated models of the power system components 
can also be used for other Energy Management System 




Figure 1: Illustration of protection zone model 
validation via DSE 
4. Protection system supervision  
In any engineering system that utilizes a data 
acquisition system to monitor and protect the system, 
the performance of the system becomes dependent on 
the validity of the measurements. Since the data 
acquisition systems can fail locally or in devices that 
process measurements or can be altered by a cyber-
attack on devices, it is important to develop methods 
that will be able to verify the validity and accuracy of 
the data. The proposed system uses dynamic state 
estimation to assess the validity and accuracy of the data 
by taking advantage of data redundancy at subsystem 
levels such as a substation, a distribution system, and 
other electrical installations. Data redundancy is defined 
as the ratio of the number of available data over the 
number of states of the system. In this section, we 
describe such an approach. The method is powerful in 
the sense that it does detect not only data anomalies but 
also identifies the root cause of the data anomalies. This 
is achieved by hypothesis testing, as described later.  
4.1. Substation Quasi-Dynamic State Estimator 
(sQSE) 
The database of setting-less relays, i.e., EBP relays, 
they can be utilized to autonomously create the 
substation QSE. Each EBP relay or other computing 
device converts the sampled values of voltage and 
currents into phasors; other sample values (speed, 
temperature, etc.) are decimated at the same rate as 
phasors. Subsequently, this data is streamed into the 
substation bus. Then, the phasor data and the models 
from the EBP relays are used to autonomously form the 
substation QSE. Hence, the following data are involved 
in the process of creating the substation QSE: (a) model 
of protection zone of the EBP (once and by exception if 
there is a model change, for example, a tap change for a 
transformer), (b) raw and estimated values of 
measurements, (c) model of measurements in object-
oriented format, and (d) status of breakers and switches 
within the protection zone of the EBP. Figure 1 
summarizes the overall process of forming the 
substation QSE. 
The substation QSE enables a centralized 
protection scheme that ensures the validity and 
trustworthiness of the data. In case of abnormalities, the 
centralized substation protection identifies the cause of 
the abnormality (hidden failures, cyber-attacks, etc.), 
corrects and replaces the corrupted data so that the 
setting-less relays will operate with corrected data, and 
will take the correct protection decisions. In other 
words, the analytics determine with computable 
certainty the following: (a) all data are valid, i.e., no 
instrumentation errors, no hidden failures, no data 
attacks, or (b) bad data are present, in which case an 
identification process is initiated to determine the root 
cause of the bad data. The identification process is 
described next. 
4.2. Anomaly detection and identification 
One of the main functionalities provided by 
substation QSE is the ability for anomaly detection and 
identification. The QSE computes the best estimate of 
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the substation’s dynamic state. Subsequently, the 
goodness of fit between the measurements and the 
substation model is computed via the well-known chi-
square test, which calculates the probability of goodness 
of fit between the measurement and the substation 
model. This probability is also referred to as confidence 
level. A high probability of goodness of fit, i.e., more 
than 0.90, results in declaring all the data in the 
substation valid. In this case, no further action is 
required. Otherwise, there is an anomaly in the data, and 
the root cause of the anomaly must be identified. For 
this purpose, a series of hypothesis testing is performed 
to identify the root cause of the bad data, i.e., hidden 
failures, bad IED settings, power fault, data alteration 
due to a cyber-attack, etc. Once the root cause is 
identified, the compromised data is known; this data can 
be replaced with estimated values using the validated 
model of the system and the operating condition. 
The aim of hypothesis testing is to identify the 
cause of data abnormalities in real-time and replace the 
compromised data with estimated values. The 
mechanics of hypothesis testing are as follows: First, 
suspect measurements are identified from normalized 
residuals, which are provided by the QSE. Second, 
suspect measurements are grouped using the source of 
the data (merging units) and also by the protection zone. 
Third, protection zones are identified for which the 
protection functions have reported a fault. These 
classifications lead to specific hypothesis tests. We are 
discussing below examples of hypothesis testing. 
Hypothesis Type 1 (H1): Remove suspect 
measurements and rerun QSE. If the probability is high 
(more than 0.9), then: (a) removed measurements are 
bad, (b) the root cause is at the devices reporting these 
measurements, (c) issue diagnostics, and (d) replace bad 
data with estimated values. End hypothesis testing. 
Otherwise, go to H2. 
Hypothesis Type 2 (H2): (determine if a fault decision 
is correct). For the reported faulted device, remove all 
internal device measurements and remove the faulted 
device model from the substation model. Then rerun 
QSE.  If the probability is high (more than 0.9), then: (a) 
the device/protection zone is truly experiencing an 
internal fault.  Allow zone relay to trip the faulted 
device. End hypothesis testing. 
Hypothesis Type 3 (H3): This test combines type 1 and 
type 2 hypothesis testing to cover the case of a 
simultaneous fault and a hidden failure. 
Note that hypothesis testing continues until the root 
cause has been identified. Then the compromised data 
are replaced with estimated values which are computed 
with the validated model and the estimated state of the 
system.  
It is important to note that the reliability of the proposed 
hypothesis testing is possible because of the large 
redundancy of measurements at the substation level. 
Redundancy is defined as the number of measurements 
available over the number of states needed to describe 
the system.  
4.3. Data correction 
In case the identified root cause is compromised 
data (from hidden failures, equipment malfunctioning, 
data alteration), the data correction/replacement process 
is executed. The hypothesis testing has identified a 
number of compromised measurements. Then using the 
model of the entire substation and the real-time 
operating conditions (both provided by the substation 
QSE), the physical quantities represented by the 
compromised measurements are computed (estimated 
values). The computed quantities are streamed into the 
process bus, replacing the actual data collected by the 
merging units. Hence, any computing device using the 
sampled values at the process bus will now be using 
corrected data. At the same time, the system issues a 
message to the operator for repairing the system and 
alleviating the source of the compromised data. 
 
 
Figure 2. Overview of resilient protection approach 
4.4. Resilient protection under failures 
According to the US Presidential Policy Directives-
21 (PPD-21), resilience is the ability to prepare for and 
adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover 
rapidly from disruptions. The disruptions include both 
physical disruptions and cyber disruptions [13]. 
Implementation of the proposed schemes creates a new 
paradigm for resiliency in protection systems with the 
capability of correcting compromised data (self-
healing), as shown in Figure 2. The proposed resilient 
protection scheme supervises all the setting-less relays 
in a substation in order to maintain the secure operation 
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of the system under failures. As illustrated in Figure 2, 
measurements are streaming from merging units into the 
setting-less relays through the process bus. In addition 
to being used by setting-less relays for the protection of 
each zone, these data are utilized to obtain the phasor 
quantities. These phasors are used to form the substation 
QSE, and consequently, ensure the data validity via the 
anomaly detection and identification process. If an 
abnormality is detected, hypothesis testing is performed 
to identify if the root cause of the abnormality. If 
compromised data have been identified, the 
compromised data are replaced with its best estimate 
obtained from the substation-wide state estimator. The 
relays will continue to perform their protective functions 
with validated data. In this way, the protection and 
control system is self-healed against the abnormality. 
Since compromised input data into a relay typically 
results in mis-operations, the proposed system ensures 
that the protection and control system continues to 
operate reliably until the root cause is repaired.  
In case of cyber disruptions, alteration or loss of 
measurements scenarios is handled the same way as any 
other source of anomaly. In terms of communication 
failures, it is important to note that most systems have 
redundant communications for reliability. Thus, the 
probability of communication loss is very low. While 
the protection and control system can revert to methods 
that are based only on local data, this topic is beyond the 
scope of this paper – also due to lack of space to cover 
this issue [14], [15]. 
The proposed approach for a resilient protection 
and control system for substations introduces numerous 
advantages over the conventional methods. The 
dynamic state estimation at the protection zone level 
eliminates the need for coordinating multiple complex 
protection schemes. This results in a much simpler 
protection scheme from the user’s point of view. 
Furthermore, it is much faster as it detects faulty 
conditions within a few measurement samples (sub-
millisecond response). Tripping, if warranted, is 
controlled by user-selected parameters (for example, a 
protection engineer may want to trip with a delay of 3 
cycles). It is more sensitive than the present technology 
as it can detect faults that legacy systems miss, such as 
high impedance faults and faults near neutrals. The 
proposed protection scheme is well suited for the new 
hardware approaches for substation protection and 
control, namely the use of merging units. Maintenance, 
calibration, and testing can be fully automated with 
appropriate software, leading to a further decrease in the 
substation operating cost [16]. 
5. Application  
Several important power systems operation and 
control applications are needed to maintain the safe and 
reliable operation of the grid. Some of these applications 
are load forecasting, optimization (ED and OPF), 
available transfer capability, security assessment, 
congestion management, visualizations, etc. The 
availability of a validated real-time model of the system 
enables these applications. The proposed scheme, i.e., 
Centralized Substation Protection (CSP), provides a 
validated real-time model and allows for the seamless 
integration of traditional and new applications. In 
previous publications, we discussed integrations of 
traditional applications such as stability monitoring and 
volt/var control [7], as well as new applications such as 
the Reserve-O-Meter (RoM), which is an application that 
evaluates the available reserves from each customer and 
utility owned resources along the distribution feeder [8]. 
The focus of this paper is on the following three 
applications: Control Center Operation, Optimal Power 
Flow and Operations Planning.  
5.1. Control center operations 
The control center is the centralized higher-level 
location for monitoring, control, and operation of the 
electricity grid. Functions of a control center can be 
grouped into (a) Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA), (b) energy management and 
optimization system, and (c) security and operational 
reliability functions.  
Data Acquisition (DA) comprises the collection of 
data at remote equipment in the field and gathered at the 
control center. The data consist of status variables, 
current and/or power flow measurements, voltage 
magnitude, and phase measurements. These 
measurements are used for further application. 
Supervisory Control (SC) is the system responsible for 
the visualization of the state of the system as well as the 
ability to control remote devices. The proposed system 
provides the next generation of SCADA since it provides 
data at rates of once per cycle (two orders of magnitude 
faster than legacy SCADA). 
The Energy Management and Optimization System 
functions depend on the real-time model of the system. 
These functions can be grouped into (a) wide-area real-
time model building and (b) optimization and energy 
management applications, such as economic dispatch, 
optimal power flow, scheduling functions, and others. 
The security and operational reliability functions are 
the “watchdog” of the system, which include security 
assessment, transient stability monitoring, voltage 
stability monitoring, and others.  
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The real-time model is constructed from the data 
provided by the proposed system, i.e., the new SCADA 
streaming into the control center at a rate of once per 
cycle. Status variables are used to determine the 
configuration of the network and other data is used to 
estimate the actual operating conditions of the system. 
Security assessment can be performed at user-selected 
intervals; when it is initiated, it will use the current 
validated model of the system. 
CSP not only improves substation protection but 
also provides the following benefits for the operations of 
the control centers: 
 Operations at higher temporal resolution: The real-
time data granularity of today’s control center 
operation is defined as 2s or so [11]. CSP allows 
for real-time to be defined as 1 cycle.  
 Real-time validated model availability: CSP 
provides a real-time validated model for each 
substation updated. The wide area network model 
is synthesized as discussed in the following 
subsection.  
 Prevention of cascading outages: The current 
industry practice, i.e., not having a validated model 
as well as operation a higher time granularity at the 
control center and a lower time granularity for the 
protection system could result in cascading outages 
such as the North American and Italian blackouts 
of 2003 [11]. CSP closes this gap and allows for 
the prevention of cascading outages.   
 Better and unprecedented supervisory control 
abilities: Today’s supervisory control (SC) is 
mostly manual, i.e., the operator issues commands; 
however, CSP allows for total or partial automation 
of SC.  CSP provides corrected data to the control 
center, allowing for the display of correct and 
uncompromised data. Which in turn, allows the 
operator to correctly visualize the system and take 
appropriate decisions in partially automated SC. 
As part of anomaly detection, CSP issues 
diagnostics/alarms that are displayed at the control 
center when it identifies that correction of the root 
cause of bad data requires human involvement (for 
example, a blown fuse).   
 Reliable DSA: CSP provides a validated real-time 
dynamic model of the system. A dynamic model of 
the system can be used to reliably perform DSA. 
 Robust modern ACG: Inverter-based resources 
(IBRs) pose a challenge for net interchange 
control, but an AGC based on the proposed method 
can address this challenge but providing control at 
much faster rates. 
In subsequent paragraphs, we discuss how the 
proposed rCSP system provides robust solutions and 
changes the paradigm of power system operations.  
5.2. System-Wide QSE (wQSE) 
The results provided by the substation-wide state 
estimation can be utilized to facilitate a system-wide 
QSE. To this end, the validated and time-tagged results 
from all substation QSEs are streamed into the control 
center. At the control center, the synthesize the operating 
conditions of the entire system are synthesized by putting 
together the state estimates of all substations of the same 
time tag, see Figure 3. In order to facilitate efficient 
communications, each substation sends only its real-time 
model to the control center, which comprises a very 
small amount of data. In case the connectivity changes, 
the connectivity data are transmitted by exception. 
Similarly, in case of a change in model, the new 
mathematical model will be transmitted by exception.  
 
 
Figure 3. Synthesis of system-wide QSE from 
substation QSEs 
 
Wide-Area Network Synthetization: CSP allows for 
seamless building of the validated wide-area network 
model from substation models, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
The substation model objects are, in turn, built from 
device model objects. Device models objects are 
constructed as follows: (1) the set of equalities and 
inequalities describing the law that governs the operation 
of the device are derived, (2) these algebraic and 
differential equations are quadratized so that the highest 
level of nonlinearity is 2, resulting in a model referred to 
as the Quadratized Device Model (QDM), (3) the QDM 
is integrated using quadratic integration to obtain a 
purely algebraic model, referred to as the State & Control 
Algebraic Quadratic Companion Form (SCAQCF).  
The SCAQCF object, which is presented in previous 
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with  ( ) ( ) Tmt tx x x  and  ( ) ( )
T
mt tu u u  
Where g1 and g4 are terminal equations and g2, g3, g5, and 
g6 are internal equations. t and tm respectively denote the 
present time and midpoint between the present time and 
the previous time t-th. Vectors i, x, u, are respectively the 
vectors of through, state, control variables. Matrices F 
and Y contain respectively linear and quadratic 
coefficients of variables at present time t. Matrix B 
contains past history terms, and matrices N and K are 
linear coefficients of variables at the previous time t-th .  
 
Figure 4. Wide Area System model building 
 Given a wide area that is made up of n substation 
equipped with CSP, using CSP results, the network 
model is synthesized as follows: interface equations at 
the terminal of the wide-area network are defined as 
illustrated in Figure 4; generalized Kirchhoff’s Current 
Law is applied at all nodes in the network, substation 
internal equations, functional constraints and controls are 
stacked to form the wide-area internal equations, 
functional constraints, and controls, and state vector is 
the union of the state vectors of substations [7][12]. The 
end result is the system-wide network model that can be 
used for practically any application in the control center.  
Two scheduling functions, namely Optimal Power 
Flow and Operational Planning, are discussed next as 
examples of utilization of the network model provided 
by the rCSP. 
5.3. Optimal Power Flow 
The validated models from substations rCSPs can be 
utilized to optimize the grid’s operating conditions, 
determining the control actions needed to achieve a 
selected objective such as minimization of area-wide 
generation cost, levelization of voltage profile, 
levelization of flow in key circuits, etc. The Optimal 
Power Flow (OPF) is the tool of choice to solve these 
optimization problems. Any OPF problem can be 
expressed in its simplest form as:  
min ( , )
. . ( , ) 0













Where ( , ),  ( , ),  and ( , )J g hx u x u x u denote the 
objective function, the power flow equations, and the 
functional constraints. All are functions of states x  and 
controls u . 
The Quadratic OPF (QOPF) formulation in 
SCAQCF is invariant whether the system is the positive 
sequence or three-phase modeling due to the use of the 
object-oriented modeling approach. This formulation is 
expressed as: 
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Network through a variable inet is a zero vector since the 
network for OPF purposes is a closed network.  
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The problem can then be solved using the Convex 
Solution – Sequential Linear Programming (CS-SLP) 
algorithm. The flow chart for CS-SLP is depicted in 
Figure 5. This algorithm is an extension of the 
Sequential Linear Programming (SLP) algorithm that 
has been presented in previous publications. In this 
algorithm, the QOPF is initially convexified, and the 
resulting convex problem is solved to provide a warm 
start for SLP. ncs is the total number of convexification 
iterations allowed. Note that if this number is set to 0, 
the algorithm simply becomes an SLP algorithm. 
 
Figure 5. Flowchart of CS-SLP algorithm for OPF 
solution  
The cost minimization OPF was solved with CS-
SLP for 3 test systems, and the results are reported in 
Table 1. The three systems are a small four bus system 
and two network models from the ARPA-E Go 
competition: Network_01R-10  and Network_02*-173. 
In all three cases, the number of convex iterations is set 
to 1, i.e., ncs  = 1. 
Table 1. Major metrics of QOPF solution with CS-

















Small System 1 
(4 buses, 2 generators, 1 transformer, 3 lines, 1 load) 
6 5 3 6308.51 6612.85 
Small System 2 
(14 buses, 5 generators, 3 transformers, 17 lines, 11 loads, 1 fixed 
shunt) 
3 4 3 13,964.21 14,686.15 
Medium System  
(500 buses, 224 generators, 193 transformers, 540 lines, 281 loads, 
5 fixed shunts, 31 switched shunt) 
6 113 53 271,401.97 273,289.62 
5.4. Operations Planning 
Operations Planning (OP) is concerned with solving 
an optimization problem over a horizon period. OP 
problems can be unit commitment, flexibility/storage 
evaluation, and planning, etc. This paper focuses on the 
Multi-Stage Quadratic Flexible Optimal Power Flow 
(MQFOPF) proposed within the platform of the rCSP. 
The MQFOPF is equivalent to summing the 
objective function at all stages and stacking up the 
constraints form each stage in the planning horizon. It is 
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Where subscript i denotes functions and vectors at stage 
i, subscript i -1 denotes the previous stage, and H is the 
number of stages in the horizon period.  
The generalized SCAQCF formulation for the 
MQFOPF is given as: 




T T T T T
Mox Mou Moxx Mouu Moxu Moc
T k T k T k
Mx Mu Mxx Muu Mux M
T i T i
Mfx Mfu Mfxx Mfuu
J Y Y F F F C
subject to
g Y Y F F F C
h Y Y F F
     
     
               
     
     
  
     
 
 
x u x u x x u u x u
x u x u x x u u u x









        
   







Where subscript M denotes that this is a multi-stage 
problem, 1 1, 1 ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
T
m H H m Ht t I t t t I t   x x x x x , 
1 1, ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
T
m H H mt t t t   u u u u u  
Similar to the single-stage OPF, this problem is solved 
using the CS-SLP algorithm, for which the flowchart is 
depicted in Figure 2. 
6. Conclusions  
 This paper presented a new paradigm for the 
protection, control, operation, and optimization of an 
electric energy system. The new model starts at the 
substation and uses dynamic state estimation protection, 
which has the following advantages relative to the new 
challenges: protection functions immunity to the 
changing characteristics of power systems such as 
reduced fault currents, reduced negative and zero 
sequence fault currents, bilateral follow of fault current 
and power flow in distribution systems, sub-millisecond 
detection times and other attractive characteristics, and 
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ability to validate the models of protection zones. In 
addition, the estimation-based protection provides data 
and models to any other level of the system to support 
the needs and applications in these levels. At the same 
time, we proposed a substation-based estimation method 
to supervise the data validity, detect data anomalies, 
identify the source of data anomalies and take corrective 
action. The integration of the estimation-based 
protection functions and the substation state estimator 
provides a system that continuously validates data and 
models and, in case of anomalies, has the capability to 
self-heal by correcting bad data. The overall system 
streams validated data and models to the control center 
to support system-wide applications. In the paper, we 
discussed several applications and focused on the 
important application of optimal power flow. The 
proposed models enable innovative methods for the 
formulation and solution of the optimal power flow. 
Specifically, a generalized method to convexify the 
optimal power flow into a convex quadratic model for 
which robust and fast solvers exist. The final solution of 
the OPF problem is obtained with SLP starting from the 
convex model and using the unrelaxed OPF model. The 
proposed approaches favorably address the challenges 
posed by the present trajectory of the power system. 
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